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The recent use of Chemical Weapons in armed conflicts and terror attacks highlights the importance 
of understanding their full impact in order to inform an effective response. This article argues that 
while the consequences of CWs on individual health have dominated our understanding of the 
impact of these weapons, far less attention has been directed to their impact on public health. The 
article conducts a review of literature on the health impact of CWs and explores two case studies of 
their use in urban settings - Halabja in northern Iraq in 1988, and throughout Syria’s ongoing conflict 
– in order to demonstrate the importance of considering the long-term health consequences of CW 
use and their impact on healthcare and health systems. Building on this analysis, the article 
highlights the importance of generating more evidence to support future research on the topic and 








‘…the very air which he breathes is poison, his chance is gone: he is merely a destined victim 
for the slaughter’ –  
A World War 1 Infantry Officer describes soldiers’ experiences of gas attacks.1 
Chemical Weapons (CWs) have recently come under the international spotlight. They have been 
repeatedly used, to tragic humanitarian effect, in the Syrian Civil War. In February 2017, a nerve 
agent was used to assassinate the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in a Malaysian 
airport. In March 2018, a chemical agent was used in an assassination attempt targeting Sergei 
Skripal, a Russian defector living in the UK, and inadvertently poisoned several others. These 
incidents highlighted the risk posed by CWs and fuelled fears that these weapons are making a 
comeback on the international stage. This article demonstrates that direct and immediate effects of 
CWs have long dominated our understanding of their health impacts. It argues that a broader public 
health approach provides a rich lens to engage with a wider range of consequences of use of these 
weapons. The article specifically highlights some aspects of the long-term impact of CW use and 
their impact on health systems, including health workers, and therefore on the provision of health 
care. The article therefore recommends building on the current available research to assess full 
impact of CW use on public health. 
The article begins with a brief historical overview that highlights the diverse contexts in which CWs 
have been used. This is followed by a survey of the current state of knowledge about their health 
impacts. Two short cases are used to highlight aspects of the public health consequences of CW use. 
The case of Halabja demonstrates the importance of considering some of the long-term 
consequences of CWs that ultimately impact public health. The case of use in Syria draws attention 
to the importance of considering how CWs can interfere with and disrupt the operation of vital 
health systems. Based on examining the academic literature and the cases, the article proposes a 
framework to examine both the short and long-term public health impact of CWs. In doing so, we 
aim to highlight the importance of considering impact on public health when a broader assessment 
of the consequences of CWs is made and, in the process, pave the road for more dedicated research 
on this topic. 
A diverse universe of cases of CWs use 
The use of toxic chemicals in warfare is as old as recorded history. Evidence points to the application 
of poisons, extracted from plants or animals, to spear and arrow tips thought to have been used for 
both hunting and combat as early as 24,000 years ago.2,3 One of the first reported examples of mass 
chemical warfare is narrated by Thucydides, who stated that in 423 BCE the Spartan army used 
arsenic smoke during a siege in the Peloponnesian War. In the modern era, toxic smoke and fumes 
were used as a battlefield tactic on numerous occasions, but it was not until the First World War that 
the era of CWs truly began.4,5  
The first modern chemical weapon (chlorine gas) had its inaugural use on 22nd April 1915 during the 
second Battle of Ypres. The effects were far greater than had been anticipated by the German 
military, to the extent that they failed to capitalise on the huge gap in Allied lines which the gas 
created.  As war on the Western Front progressed, both sides employed a variety of CWs, including 
chlorine, phosgene and mustard gas.  By November 1918, CW use had caused an estimated 
combined toll of 1.3 million casualties including 90,000 dead.6 The effectiveness of CWs as a 
battlefield weapon was at least partly due to their psychological effects. Soldier-poet Wilfred Owen 
vividly described the terror of a gas attack in the poem Dulce et decorum est, and many WW1 
officers testified to the fact that gas was as significant a cause of ‘shell shock’ – an acute and 
disabling stress reaction - as was actual shelling.7  
Instances of CW use since the First World War have reinforced their physical and psychological 
impacts, which are inevitably associated with their insidious and deadly nature. They have been used 
on a large scale during the Iraq-Iran war,8,9 against the Kurds in Halabja and more recently and 
repeatedly in the context of the Syrian civil war.10,11 Their use has not only been confined to the 
battlefield. They have also been used in non-conflict urban settings as part of terrorist operations or 
as an assassination tool. In 1995, the Japanese cult organisation Aum Shinrikyo used Sarin gas in a 
terrorist attack on the Tokyo Subway.12,13,14 More targeted examples of CW use can be found in the 
case of the Russian defector Sergei Skripal in the UK15,16 and North Korean Kim Jong-nam in 
Malaysia.17,18 International law, which has not been unanimously adhered to, classifies CWs as 
illegitimate weapons of war, with the Geneva Protocol (1925), the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (1972) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) all banning their use.19 
Methodology 
Research for this article commenced with a scoping review of grey literature to inform our search 
terms and search strategy followed by an academic literature review of sources addressing the 
health impacts of CWs. We searched the following academic databases: Medline (ovid), Embase, 
PsycINFO and Global Health for peer-reviewed research reflecting the state of knowledge on health 
consequences of CWs. This was followed by a targeted search in grey literature to extract more 
details on public health impacts of CWs, particularly in relation to the two case studies.  
We used 10 different search terms referring to CWs such as “chemical warfare”, “Sarin” and 
“Mustard gas”; 7 different terms referring to health such as “healthcare”, “health”, and “morbidity”; 
and 5 search terms referring to relationship such as “impact” and effect. The search on the academic 
databases returned 3940 hits, most of which are related to therapeutic health interventions that use 
some chemical agents and animal studies. Therefore, we introduced other 7 search terms referring 
to settings such as “conflict”, “war” and “terrorism”; limited the search to studies on human; and 
removed duplicates. This returned 464 entries. These entries were then filtered to collect only 
articles that have the chemical search terms in their titles and in are English. This reduced the 
outputs to 85 entries whose abstracts were read, based on relevance to our study topic, and the full 
text of selected entries were read. The full list of the search terms can be seen in the table below.  
Table 1 List of search terms  
Chemical weapons Health Relationship Settings 
Chemical warfare Health care Impact Conflict* 
Chemical weapon* Health* Effect War* 
Chemical attack* Morbidity Association Armed conflict 
Sarin Mortality Correlation Insurgency* 
Mustard gas Health system Relation* Atrocity* 
Chlorine Health service*  Terror* 
Nerves agent* Public health  Humanitarian* 
Blistering agent*    
Choking agent*    
Blood agent*    
(Search terms with asterisks refer to truncation used in the search) 
The paper then employed two case studies, which were chosen based on field experience, to 
highlight public health consequences that are under-studied in the literature. For the case studies, 
we used descriptive analysis of secondary data and direct observations in addition to the desk 
review. The direct observations are drawn from the experience of one author (AE) who was involved 
in the medical response to CWs incidents in Syria, and another (DF) who worked for an aid 
organisation in areas of Iraqi Kurdistan that still bear the scars of such attacks in the 1980s.  
For the Syria case study, we relied on a dataset developed by Human Rights Watch that collated 
reported allegations of CW use in Syria from 2013 to 2018. The data set draws from the following 
seven data sources: Human Rights Watch, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons−United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, 
the OPCW Fact−finding Mission in Syria, the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the 
Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria, Amnesty International, and Bellingcat (an open source 
investigative organization). Considering the sensitivity of such information in an active conflict, it is 
difficult to find a one reliable source, which is why we relied on this dataset which allows for cross 
checking and triangulation from seven sources reporting incidents over the same timeframe. When 
sources provided a different estimate of causalities and deaths, an average number was used.   
Current knowledge on the health impact of CW 
Each group of CWs is associated with different sets of health problems that also depend on the 
mode of exposure (quantity of agent and route of exposure) as well as the health conditions of 
exposed victims. A widely accepted grouping of chemical agents classify them into four groups; 
nerves agents such as Sarin, which interfere with neural transmission through inhibiting the enzyme 
acetyl cholinesterase, leading to neural over-stimulation or paralysis;20 blistering agents (also known 
as a “vesicants”) such as Sulphur Mustard, which cause cell death through the irreversible alkylation 
of DNA, RNA and proteins;21 choking agents such as Chlorine, which primarily affect the respiratory 
tract through pulmonary irritation;22 and blood agents such as Arsine, which attack red blood cells 
and prevent the body from transporting oxygen.23 
Most studies reviewed (see figure 2) emphasised immediate and mid-term consequences of CWs on 
individual health focusing on clinical presentation and health response and treatment guidelines. 
The clinical presentation varies with different chemical agents. For example, blistering agents are 
associated with skin burns, painful erythema, and blepharospasm (involuntary closure of the eyelids) 
in the case of eye exposure; nerves agents are associated with neurological symptoms such as 
miosis, headache and convulsions; and choking agents are associated with chest tightness and 
breathlessness. 24 Also, health response received attention through developing relevant treatment 
protocols, and decontamination and protection guidelines.  
In addition to the focus on individual health in the short term, the reviewed studies also highlight 
some of the mid and long-term health effects, mainly on morbidity and quality of life. In particular, 
CW exposure has been linked to chronic health problems such as respiratory, dermatological and 
eye problems.25 Organophosphate nerve agents are specifically thought to cause difficulties in 
intellectual functioning and flexibility of thinking, difficulties in simple motor skills, fatigue, visual 
disturbances, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and sleeping disorders. A study on the Tokyo 
Sarin incident in 1995 found associations with lower psychomotor performance, fatigue and PTSD 6-
8 months after exposure to the gas. 26 We found a larger number of studies providing evidence 
related to the long-term effects of Mustard gas, probably because of the longer and more 
widespread history of its military use. Those effects include respiratory and skin cancers, chronic skin 
problems, chronic respiratory disease such as asthma, chronic eye disease, and PTSD. 
Nevertheless, no evidence was found for any cause-specific mortality related to non-lethal mustard 
gas exposure as reported by a fifty-year cohort study on veterans who participated in mustard gas 
chamber tests during World War II. 27   
We found relatively few studies about the wider public health impacts of CWs. A pilot study on only 
30 Vietnamese women provided some evidence for CWs effects related to reproductive health 
outcomes such as miscarriage, premature birth and congenital malformation.28 Also, the association 
between CWs exposure and psychological disorders could potentially have effects on community 
and social health outcomes. Some studies propose environmental impacts of CWs (based on animals 
and plants experiments) through ecosystem disruption resulting in economic and food production 
deficits.29 A report by the World Health Organization discussed potential public health impacts of 
CWs including carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, disruption of the ecosystem, and reduction in both the 
quality and quantity of food supplies. 30   
In order to identify the CWs incidents, agents and effects that received more attention in the 
literature, we conducted basic bibliometric analysis of the identified 91 studies. For incident-specific 
studies, the Iranian-Iraqi war (1980-1988) was on the top of list with 18 studies, followed by the 
terrorist attack on Tokyo subway with 5 studies, Syria with 2 studies, and one study per incident for 
each of Halabja, Vietnam war, WWI and WWII; whereas the majority of the studies (52/91) had no 
geographical focus. In relation to types of effects, 29 studies focused on short term consequences, 
31 on mid and long-term morbidity, 10 on security effects, and 5 on environmental and public health 
impacts. In terms of agent-specific studies, 21 studies were on Mustard Gas, 12 on nerve agents 
(mainly Sarin), and 8 on Chlorine. Most studies were published either in the US (34 studies) or in the 
UK (24 studies). However, when it comes to the location of the first author, the US remains first with 
21 studies followed by Iran with 15 studies. The following figures summarises some of this basic 
bibliometric analysis. 
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 here please] 
Long term health consequences: CWs use in Halabja  
In March 1988, Saddam Hussein’s military forces bombed the city of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan with 
CWs, resulting in approximately 5,000 immediate deaths and thousands more injured.31 Based on 
the recorded symptoms of survivors, the bombs are thought to have contained a combination of 
mustard gas and the nerve agents Tabun, Sarin and VX gas.32 These deadly, heavier-than-air 
munitions were preceded by hours of conventional bombardment that forced the population into 
underground bomb shelters, which subsequently became gas chambers when the CWs were 
dropped.33 The attack was part of the explicitly genocidal ‘Anfal’ campaign against the Kurdish 
population of northern Iraq (which resulted in approximately 100,000 deaths in total), and caused 
significant long-term public health impacts for the local population.25,32  
One might think that the immediate effects were bad enough as recalled by a survivor who returned 
to her village after the attack: 
“Dead bodies—human and animal—littered the streets, huddled in doorways, 
slumped over the steering wheels of their cars. Survivors stumbled around, 
laughing hysterically, before collapsing… Those who had been directly exposed to 
the gas found that the symptoms worsened as the night wore on. Many children 
died along the way and were abandoned where they fell.” 33 
However, more than 30 years later, the population of northern Iraq still suffers from the effects of 
the Anfal campaign.  The social and economic impact of those killed or displaced by the atrocity is 
significant. The demographic structure of the region changed dramatically after the campaign with 
conflict-related emigration of up to 75% of Halabja citizens and severe environmental impacts which 
damaged the local agrarian economy.34 CWs are strongly suspected to be the cause of the increased 
population burden of respiratory, dermatological, ophthalmic and neurological problems, as well as 
congenital malformations and cancers in the local area.25,35 The environmental impacts of the CWs 
used have also affected the local ecosystem, thus magnifying the impact on agriculture and the 
economy of the region.34  
Impact on healthcare and health system: CWs use in Syria 
The Syrian Civil War, which started in 2011 and continues at the time of writing in 2019, has seen the 
most recent large-scale use of chemical warfare.36 A recent report by the Global Public Policy 
Institute (GPPi) suggests that the use of CWs in Syria is significantly higher than has been reported, 
and that 98% of incidents can be attributed to the Syrian government.37 Meanwhile, analysis of the 
dataset we collated for CWs incidents in Syria shows that from March 2013 to February 2018, 85 
reported incidents took place causing a total of 1,385 deaths and 6,568 injuries.   
The data also shows that the majority of reported incidents used three particular chemical agents: 
Sarin, Sulphur Mustard and Chlorine. Sarin was associated with the highest number of casualties 
reaching approximately 1,117 deaths in the Ghouta attack of August 2013. The second highest was 
Sulphur Mustard that was used in Aleppo on 21 August 2015 resulting in 85 deaths. Reported uses of 
Chlorine gas have not resulted in any recorded fatalities.  
Furthermore, the injury numbers mentioned above refer only to physical injuries, and the 
psychological impacts of these attacks remains inadequately reported by health and security actors. 
Reports by journalists, human rights groups and international organisations all depict widespread 
confusion, anxiety and a sense of helplessness and entrapment amongst victims. This can be in part 
attributed to widespread bereavement due to loss of family and community members, and in part to 
the terror caused by the impact of CWs. Those psychological effects, such as PTSD, could last years. 
For instance, some internally displaced persons coming from Ghouta to Idlib in 2018 were still 
experiencing mental health issues associated with the Sarin attack in 2013. The terror caused by the 
Ghouta attack in 2013 is described thus by a doctor: 
‘The fear and horror in people’s eyes were more difficult than death.’38  
In addition to these direct effects, CWs attacks in Syria have had indirect effects on the health 
system. Reports from international organisations and testimonies from medical staff indicate that 
the health services struggled to effectively deal with the chemical attacks and were repeatedly 
overwhelmed with numbers of casualties. This was exacerbated by the debilitated nature of health 
care facilities in Syria during the conflict which were starved of resources and staff and frequently 
directly targeted in the fighting. One report by a local NGO shows that as a result of the Sarin attack 
on Ghouta three out of four medical units in the town of Zamalka had to shut down.39 Moreover, 
CWs attacks far exceeded the capacity of the health facilities to respond and compromised their 
ability to attend to other health needs of the community. Meanwhile, when they had the capacity to 
respond, the lack of protective equipment for medical staff made them prone to contamination and 
even death.39 This is on top of the acute psychological trauma that paralysed some medical staff 
from responding and had long-term effects on other staff who experienced anxiety and fear. Those 
effects, compounded by many other challenges such as ‘conventional’ bombardment and difficulties 
of day to day living, are thought to have pushed some of the medical staff to flee the country. The 
wider social, economic and environmental effects of CWs use in Syria seem to be considerable and 
to have a profoundly negative influence on population health. 
Discussion 
Based on our literature review, some of the wider public health impacts of CW use seem to have 
been overlooked. While the available literature emphasises the immediate, mid and long-term 
impact of CWs use on individual health, it often fails to provide an evidence-based examination of 
public health impact including long-term consequences and impact on health systems. Therefore, we 
argue that research into chemical weapons needs to reconceptualise the health impacts of such 
weapons and generate more evidence that could influence related practice, policies and 
accountability measures.  
The two case studies presented in this article demonstrate how the impact of CWs extends far 
beyond immediate effects. In the Halabja case, studies 30 years after the exposure are still showing 
detrimental health outcomes on both individual and community levels. In the Syria case, CWs caused 
further disruption to the already shattered health system particularly in opposition-held areas where 
the majority of attacks took place. 
In assessing the impact of use of CWs on public health, this article highlights the importance of 
considering both direct and indirect effects thereof. Direct health impacts can be physical due to 
exposure to the toxic agents, but also psychological due to the panic, stress, bereavement and 
anxiety that are associated with use of CWs, particularly when applied on a large scale or against 
unprepared civilians. Use of CWs can also have an impact on health services, as first respondents or 
medical professionals can become exposed either directly or through cross contamination. Chemical 
attacks can often result in mass casualties that overwhelm medical infrastructure and systems, 
effectively curtailing their ability to attend to all victims or to other health needs of the wider 
population. This effect can be particularly aggravated if medical facilities are already debilitated or 
compromised as a result of an on-going conflict. Moreover, indirect impact of CWs could be 
extended to include environmental, social and economic effects. 
To systematically assess the broader public health impact of CWs, the following three levels are key: 
1. Individual health: which could be either physical or psychological effects; 
2. Community health: through indirect effects on health systems and socio-economic impacts; 
3. Environmental effects: through direct contamination of water, food and livestock, and 
indirect effects on the ecosystem. 
Based on these three levels, we have developed a framework for conceptualising the public health 
impacts of CWs (see Figure 4). 
[Figure 4 here please] 
This approach requires consideration of the whole of the patient pathway for those affected, 
including potential long-term health impacts on the casualties and psychological impacts on others.  
Because of the wide area impact of CWs, the need for decontamination of casualties, non-casualties, 
equipment and the environment, and their impact on ecosystems, this requires a multi-sectoral 
approach as well as the establishment of systems for long-term follow-up.      
Therefore, we believe that an effective health systems preparedness approach to address these 
consequences is necessary and needs to take the following considerations into account: 
(1) An appropriate system of triage, both at the point of exposure and throughout the health 
system. The triage should be informed by ethical guidance developed in collaboration with 
the local communities.  
(2) Medical personnel and auxiliary staff should have proper individual protection against CWs in 
relation to availability of equipment as well as training on how to use them.  
(3) A monitoring service, both to identify immediate threats and for long term monitoring and 
assessment of the exposure. 
(4) Epidemiological approaches to identify public health impacts including the likely distant 
hazard of a chemical plume.  
(5) Clinical guidance on best practices of dealing with different types of chemical agents. This 
includes decontamination, medication, respiratory support, and managing agent-specific 
symptoms. 
(6) An appropriate system of documentation and information management. 
As CWs are banned under various protocols and conventions of international law, and as their use 
constitutes a war crime, collecting evidence becomes important for attribution and accountability. 
The same goes for the use of chemical weapons outside of conflict, where health actors in 
collaboration with local police and with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
should take into account forensic aspects when collecting, recording and labelling data and evidence 
in the aftermath of CWs incidents.  The need to collect evidence that will stand up in a Court of Law 
imposes requirements which might be frustrated by the clinical emergency and there thus needs to 
be advanced co-ordination and subsequent co-operation between the health and police or security 
services.  
Conclusion 
While the bulk of historical CWs stockpiles have been destroyed,40 their recent use in intra-state 
armed conflicts, targeted assassinations and terror attacks highlights the importance of 
understanding the full impact of CWs use. This understanding contributed to preparedness and the 
ability of health systems to deliver an effective and comprehensive response. The effects on 
individuals vary according to the levels of protection available, the mode of exposure, as well as the 
vulnerability of the targeted population such as babies, elderly, and people with pre-existing 
morbidity. Indirect effects on public health highlight the need for incorporating CWs preparedness 
plans into designing health interventions in conflict settings. This includes emergency and 
contingency planning, training for medical staff, and community awareness. Thus, based on the 
recent use of CWs, and considering their wider health impacts, we argue that health systems need to 
be better prepared to deal with incidents of this nature. 
The recent use of CWs has caused widespread condemnation but also triggered questions about the 
adequacy of international verification and accountability measures. Furthermore, their use in an on-
going protracted conflict imposes limitations on access for weapons inspectors, humanitarian 
workers and health professionals to targeted areas. This raises the importance of understanding the 
full impact of their use and increasing the level of preparedness to deal with the individual but also 
the public health consequences of such use when it occurs. By demonstrating the importance of the 
public health consequences of CW and proposing a framework for their assessment, this article 
emphasises the importance of dedicated studies to generate new empirical data on the topic that 
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